What It's Like To Compete With Microsoft

 It was 1998, the same year that Google.com registered as a domain and Apple launched the iMac that I incorporated into an IT software business.

At that time, the intranets were localized, they had to be personalized, they were primitive and spectacularly ugly. But web applications were about to dominate the world, so we started building web-based intranets for businesses. Because most of our customers were asking for exactly the same things, in 2003 we were busy selling a prepared version.

But, around the same time, Microsoft - then in 79th place in Fortune 500 and generating revenues of $ 22,956 million - had the same idea. Launched SharePoint in 2001, its web-based platform that integrates with Microsoft Office.

It was an extremely difficult time. There were literally two of us working in a garage, with a heater, and our income was comparatively insignificant.

We had heard rumors that Microsoft was giving away free SharePoint licenses to block businesses in Windows. We could not afford to offer leading loss deals to build our customer base.

We had two options: pack everything or fight. We chose the latter because we assumed that if Microsoft was willing to invest in intranets, we should be in something.

We decided that its presence in the market should give us the confidence to persevere and the determination to differentiate ourselves.

If Microsoft were Goliath, we would be David.

We became tactical and dedicated to dissect SharePoint, which was, in my opinion, the most horrible software on the planet: just many ugly boxes. It was sold as a framework on which to build, which means that companies that wanted to use it would need internal IT experience to make it viable.

Armed with that knowledge, we had a clear direction. We decided to focus on the creation of software that could be used by any company, regardless of their internal IT experience. And it had to be beautiful and easy to customize.

We had been watching what Apple, which at that time was an exotic and exciting company, had been doing to upset Microsoft with its clean, clear and beautiful technology that worked directly, and we knew that our strategy had to be similar, even if in a much smaller scale.

Another big problem we faced was the appearance of numerous IT companies that were building on SharePoint, which facilitated their use and sold their solutions to the business market.

There was little we could do about it. There is competition in all markets, and if there is no alarm, the bells should ring, but we suspect that making the "choice" a central commercial value would help our cause.

We knew we had to support Windows, but our staff was naturally Linux in the first days, which led us to offer the client a selection of servers. This was an extremely expensive strategy, but it turned out to be the right one.

Later, we offered a hosting option in the cloud and on the premises -the first is used mainly by financial services companies that need the strictest IT security controls- and customized compilations for customers who need functionalities that our product Central did not offer.

Until a couple of years ago, we operated a lot in the shadow of SharePoint, with Microsoft shaping the competitive landscape. Potential customers looking for a digital workplace would be looking to move from SharePoint or pondering against one another.

But a radical change in terms of increasing customer expectations about the software came from smartphones. Smart phones opened their eyes to the idea that technology can be beautiful, functional and operate without much experience, another legacy of Apple. They gave people confidence to use technologies that were not built by Microsoft

Today, our annual turnover is $ 2.7 million and we have 600,000 users, mainly in the United States. By contrast, SharePoint has 190 million users in 200,000 companies and a recognized brand in the far reaches of the world.

Our strategy remains the same: differentiate by choice, speed, beauty and easy personalization, but if we are going to knock down Goliath, it will be a slow death, instead of a blow, a death.